Pragmatyzm Williama Jamesa

 Andrzej Stępnik

Pragmatyzm Williama Jamesa: ujęcie systemowo-krytyczne

ISBN: 978-83-7507-090-3
[ format B5, s. 265, Summary, Indeks nazwisk ]

Zob. wypowiedź Autora (film)

Zob. strona własna Autora

SPIS TREŚCI

0. Wprowadzenie

1. Pragmatyzm Williama Jamesa
1.1 Pragmatyzm Jamesa jako metoda
1.2 Pragmatyzm Jamesa jako postawa filozoficzna
1.3 Historyczno–filozoficzne podłoże pragmatyzmu

2. Epistemologiczno–ontologiczne podstawy pragmatyzmu Williama Jamesa
2.1 Geneza pojęć, porządek percepcyjny a porządek pojęciowy
2.2 Ontologiczny status porządku pojęciowego, obiektów logiki i matematyki
2.3 Poznanie bezpośrednie i poznanie pośrednie

3. Zasada pragmatyczna Williama Jamesa
3.1 Zasada pragmatyczna Peirce’a
3.2 Zasada pragmatyczna Jamesa
3.3 Dyskusja nad adekwatnością zasady pragmatycznej Jamesa

4. Pragmatyczna koncepcja prawdy Williama Jamesa
4.1 Pragmatyczna krytyka klasycznej koncepcji prawdy
4.2 Relacje między zasadą pragmatyczną a pragmatyczną koncepcją prawdy
4.3 Sformułowanie pragmatycznej koncepcji prawdy Jamesa 
4.3 Dyskusja wokół pragmatycznej koncepcji prawdy Jamesa

5. Rozszerzony model racjonalności Williama Jamesa
5.1 Standardowy model racjonalności
5.2 Rozszerzenie standardowego modelu racjonalności
5.3 Dyskusja nad zasadnością Jamesowskiego rozszerzenia modelu racjonalności

6. Zastosowania metody pragmatycznej
6.1 Monizm vs pluralizm
6.2 Problem istnienia wolnej woli
6.3 Postawa fatalistyczna i determinizm
6.4 Teizm–agnostycyzm–ateizm

7. Pragmatyzm jako postawa filozoficzna 
7.1 Empiryzm — empiryzm radykalny
7.2 Praktycyzm i holizm
7.3 Pluralizm i otwartość
7.4 Tychizm i wolna wola
7.5 Religijność i melioryzm
7.6 Zależności między metodą pragmatyczną a postawą pragmatyczną

8. Zakończenie

Summary

Bibliografia

Indeks osób

SUMMARY

The objective of the book is to present William James’ pragmatism and to examine, how actual pragmatism is.

In Chapter One, I outline the historical and cultural background of pragmatism, and consider what James understood by ‘pragmatism’. From the James’ point of view, pragmatism has two aspects: in the primary sense pragmatism is a method, consists of pragmatic maxim, pragmatic theory of truth and extended model of rationality, and in the second sense pragmatism is a philosophical attitude. Pragmatism is only a part of James’ philosophy and it is logically independent from his psychological results and ontological doctrines like radical empiricism or tychism. On this account, it is a mistake to equate pragmatism with whole of James’ philosophy.

In Chapter Two, I discuss the epistemological and ontological base of James’ pragmatism. I consider the differences between percepts and concepts, direct and indirect cognition (and corresponding with them knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description). I also discuss the status of logical and mathematical propositions and legitimacy of holism, postulated by James.

In Chapter Three, I present the pragmatic maxim, which is a method of establishing the meaning of concepts. First, I present Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, because there are some historical and logical reasons to treat James’ pragmatic maxim as an amplification of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim. I single out three meanings of Peirce’s term ‘practical consequences’, examine what relation is between expression, which meaning we want to get out, and practical consequences of this expression, and I determine range of adjustability of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim. The same things I consider in case of James’ pragmatic maxim. I also reply to criticism about James’ pragmatic maxim.

In Chapter Four, I put forward the pragmatic theory of truth. Pragmatic theory of truth is a result of applying the pragmatic maxim to sentence ‘ExistssomeAthatAistrue’.IbeginwithelaborationofJames’criticism of the classic theory of truth. James argued that adequate theory of truth

must be epistemic. Second, I present in detail James’ theory of truth. Main criterions of truth are verification (verificability) and utility (in the wider sense). The pragmatic theory of truth applies different procedure to every kind of statements: empirical statements, a priori truths, and axiological and religious beliefs. And last, I defend James’ ideas from arguments of his critics.

In Chapter Five, I focus on a procedure of acceptance of axiological and religious statements, which was presented by James in The Will to Believe. I call it ‘extended model of rationality’. First, I outline the standard model of rationality and try to show its limitation. Next I propose the thesis that standard model of rationality should be extended, because it cannot decide all of important statements. I present James’s propositions against a background of Nozick’s conditions of rationality and Bayesian theory of decisions. I also defend extended model rationality as a good extension of the standard model.

In Chapter Six, I show the applications of pragmatic method to some philosophical problems (monism vs. pluralism, problem of free will, fa- talistic attitude and determinism, theism vs. atheism and agnosticism).

In Chapter Seven, I put forward pragmatism as the philosophical attitude. I single out components of the pragmatic attitude which are strongly linked with pragmatism like empiricism, holism, practicality and — which I call — openness, and components (like radical empiricism as special ontology, tychism, idea of free will existing, religiousness and meliorism) which can be treated as results of applying of the pragmatic method to some problems. I show relations between the pragmatic method and the pragmatic attitude.

My conclusion is that James’ pragmatism offers useful method and interesting attitude. In my opinion, philosophy of pragmatism is actual and worthy of development.

INDEKS OSOBOWY

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Bayes Th. 165, 166 Bergson H. 9, 18, 30, 43, 47, 258 Berkeley G. 89, 123, 181, 183, 184, 185 Bertalanffy von L. 237, 240, 260 Biegański W. 139 Blackburn S. 80, 145, 147, 259, 260 Boring E. G. 34 Borzym S. 124 Bradley F. H. 49, 108, 139, 189, 194, 199, 203, 206 Brandt R. B. 163, 260 Bridgman P. W. 78, 79, 80, 81 Brokmeyer H. 33 Bruner J. 44 Buczyńska-Garewicz H. 29, 32, 33, 39, 62, 63, 66, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 76, 89, 139, 218, 257 Bunyan J. 244

Carlyle Th. 33 Carnap R. 70, 73, 74, 260 Chalmers A. 58, 260 Chwedeńczuk B. 11, 13, 21, 29, 30, 57, 66, 84, 104, 105, 122, 123, 139, 140, 141, 142, 156, 176, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 258, 259, 260 Chwistek L. 124, 260 Clarke Jr D. S. 112, 258 Clifford W. K. 172, 179, 183 Cobb-Stevens R. 7, 127, 231, 258 Coleridge S. T. 33 Copleston F. 29, 30, 32, 50, 70, 258, 260 Cousin V. 33 Coyne G. V. 151, 260 Craig E. 15, 258

Damasio A. R. 94, 260 Darwin K. 33, 34, 36 David M. 112 Dewey J. 8, 15, 31, 33, 50, 122, 232, 258 Dobrosielski M. 63, 72, 73, 258 Duhem P. 58, 121 Dummett M. 7, 138, 260 Duns J. Szkot 211

Edwards J. 31, 35, 258, 259 Emerson R. W. 32, 260 Eriugena J. Szkot 211 Euklides 117 Everett H. 82, 83, 103, 107

Feitzinger J. V. 83 Fisch M. H. 35 Fiske J. 35 Flournoy T. H. 14, 20, 205, 207, 241, 246, 258 Foulkes P. 188, 226, 262 Friedman L. 66, 67, 258 Fuller B. A. G. 35, 258 Fuller M. 32

Geier M. 76, 260 Glendower E. 7 Goodman N. 7 Green N. J. 35 Grobler A. 21, 74, 81, 150, 257, 260, 261 Gutowski P. 32

Harris W. T. 33 Hedge F. H. 32 Hegel G. W. F. 33, 199 Heidegger M. 7 Heller M. 151, 260 Hempoliński M. 140, 141, 260 Holmes O. W. 35, 36, 37, 258 Hołówka T. 65, 260 Hospers J. 66, 260 Hume D. 170, 174, 189

James W. passim Jaspers K. 12, 260 Jedynak A. 13, 58, 65, 70, 260 Johnson A. 23, 40, 206 Johnson S. 31

Kant I. 32, 33, 248 Kartezjusz 94, 188, 211, 260 Kellog F. R. 37, 258 Kleszcz R. 149, 150, 151, 154, 260 Kmita J. 164, 165, 260 Kotarbiński T. 139

Lange F. A. 30 Lang W. 37 Leibniz G. T. 188, 199, 213, 214, 261 Leslie J. 83 Leśniewski S. 139 Leuba J. H. 243 Levinson H. S. 112, 258 Losee J. 79, 261 Lovejoy A. O. 12, 17, 87, 98, 106, 139, 258

Mach E. 121 Mackie J. L. 176, 179, 180, 181, 183, 258 Marciszewski W. 76, 112, 261 Marody M. 24, 223, 261 McCosh J. 33 McTaggart J. E. 108, 139 Mead G. R. S. 15, 33 Merrill K. R. 35 Milhaud G. S. 121 Moore G. E. 7, 108, 139, 142, 143, 144, 258, 259 Morris Ch. 31, 34, 259 Mounce H. O. 19, 50, 259

Newton I. 117, 146 Nietzsche F. 12, 260 Niniluoto I. 112 Nowak L. 164, 165, 260 Nowak S. 24, 25, 261 Nozick R. 149, 153, 162, 163, 256, 261

Ostwald W. 121

Papini G. 30 Parker T. 32 Parrington V. L. 32, 261 Pascal B. 177, 211 Pearson K. 121 Peirce C. S. 15, 17, 19, 29, 31, 33, 35, 39, 50, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 96, 97, 98, 101, 103, 106, 107, 114, 116, 119, 127, 138, 139, 205, 209, 255, 257, 258, 259 Perry R. B. 7, 9, 20, 21, 205, 241, 259 Pietruska-Madej E. 169, 261 Plotyn 199 Pogorzelski W. A. 238, 261 Poincare H. 58, 121 Popper K. 70, 115, 116, 169, 227, 261 Przełęcki M. 70, 94, 152, 176, 177, 178, 179, 261 Putnam H. 7, 57, 58, 59, 150, 234, 253, 259, 261

Quine W. V. O. 7, 15, 16, 35, 53, 58, 70, 192, 233, 234, 237, 252, 259, 261

Reck A. J. 51, 52, 53, 251 Renouvier Ch. B. 30 Ripley G. 32 Rorty R. 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 19, 50, 259, 262 Royce J. 49 Russell B. 7, 60, 108, 123, 139, 140, 145, 146, 147, 259, 261 Ruyssen Th. 121

Sady W. 60, 138, 260, 261 Santayana G. 31 Sarkowicz R. 37, 38 Schelling F. W. J. 199 Schiller F. C. S. 17, 18, 20, 29, 259 Schlick M. 70 Secrétan Ch. 216 Seigfried Ch. H. 34, 40, 259 Seligman E. R. A. 23, 40, 206 Shanan R. W. 35 Sigwart Ch. 121 Sintonen M. 112 Skarga B. 124, 261 Spencer H. 34, 57 Spinoza B. 188, 199, 237, 243, 251 Stelmach J. 37, 38 Stępnik A. 116, 200, 261 Strelau J. 44, 93, 212, 262 Szaniawski K. 164, 262 Szczubiałka M. 114, 227

Tatarkiewicz W. 30, 126, 259 Thoreau H. 32 Tołstoj L. 244 Tomasz z Akwinu 211 Twardowski K. 139

Vaihinger H. 30 Vesey G. 188, 226, 262

Wabbel T. D. 83, 262 Weber M. 216, 262 West C. 32 Whitman W. 243 Wilson D. J. 36 Wilson T. D. 24 Wójcicki R. 70 Woleński J. 38, 80, 108, 112, 115, 141, 260, 261, 262 Wright Ch. 33, 35, 36 Wulff D. M. 243, 244, 245, 260

Zenon z Elei 48 Zimbardo Ph. G. 213, 262

Życiński J. 82, 83, 262